Lockes Criterion Of Personal Identity

Lockes Criterion Of Personal IdentityWho am I? What makes me, me? The possible action of some unityal identity has been considered oneness of the most change questions that philosophy has taken a deeper look into. The theory of individualised identity tries to deal with the questions about how an individual at one time and place is the alike(p) individual at another time and place. When we look at personal identity, we are trying to figure out what sets us apart from other pieces of matter, species and individuals. In this essay I will discuss John Lockes banner of sameness of soul for the theory of personal identity and why he does not hazard that other physical or psycho logical criteria fit, a challenge to Lockes criterion posed by Thomas Reid using the logic of transitiveness analogy, and lastly how the pointed intellection of co-occur chains of memory that Derek Parfit poses to reform Lockes view so that it may meet the challenge posed by Thomas Reid is a good ance stor to the challenge because it keeps Lockes theory intact and also adds the transitivity property that Reid challenges Lockes theory on.When discussing personal identity, the criterion of identity will strongly depend on the object that you are talking about. There stir been many viewpoints as to what the criterion of personal identity of the self or a person is. Some viewpoints suggest that the criterion for the self is organic that our eubstance is what identifies us over time. Locke invokes that this criterion is not relevant for personal identity of a person because of situations like soundbox switch (Freaky Friday situation). If the consciousness of two people were to switch, e veryone would commend that you are the same person because you look like the same person. However, it is not actually you in your body and because there is a different consciousness in your body, and your body is no longer you your body cannot define your personal identity. Other views describe the criterion as being substance that makes us the same over time. Substance includes both non-physical (soul) and physical substances. According to Locke, substance as a criterion is not applicable for personal identity of a person because of situations like death. When you die, you may be made of the same substance, but if you cease to think (thinking is connected to being a person) then you cease to exist and have no personal identity.Locke looks towards a psychological criterion to define personal identity of a person. According to Locke, a person or the self is different than just matter and just a living thing. A person is a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places which it does only by that consciousness which is inherent from thinking. This describes what is known as sameness of consciousness. We are the same person to the point where we are conscious of our past and fu ture memory or mental state in the same way that we are conscious of our current memory or mental state. This criterion can also be broken overpower into an analogy said by Locke person x is the same as person y if person y is consciously connected to x in the sense that person y can esteem the thoughts and actions of person x. According to Locke, the necessary criterion of personal identity is sameness of consciousness. This sameness of consciousness observes outright from memory and experience. Locke believes that the sameness of consciousness is the ideal criterion of personal identity for a person because since consciousness is always connected to thinking, and being able to think is what makes a person a person and allows that person to distinguish its own thoughts from anothers, as far back as our consciousness can be encompassing to any past thought, so far back will our identity extend. As far back as the person can repeat or reflect on a past thought or action with its current consciousness, so far back is the personal identity of the person.Thomas Reid, as well as many other philosophers and critics who oppose the idea of sameness of consciousness criterion, otherwise known as memory theory, have a very hard time agreeing that sameness of consciousness is a necessary criterion for personal identity. They understand that the sufficient condition that the view of sameness of consciousness criterion is trying to state is achievable if I remember eating a manifold chocolate counterfeit bar, then I must have been the one that really ate the triple chocolate fudge bar. However, they dont understand how sameness of consciousness is a necessary condition for personal identity that if I cannot remember eating the triple chocolate fudge bar, then it is impossible that I was the one who ate the triple chocolate fudge bar. The fact that it is impossible for you to have the same personal identity if you cannot remember that past thought or action is where Reids challenge arises.Reids challenge towards Lockes theory is presented in the form of the logic of transitivity analogy that states that if x is related to y, and y is related to z, then x is related to z. Using a modern example, Reids theory follows that the dwarfish girl who play in the sand(x) is the same person who was a student at the University of Toronto(y) and the person who was a student at the University of Toronto(y) is the same as the woman who is CEO of a banking firm(z), and therefore using the logic of transitivity, the little girl who play in the sand(x) is therefore the same person as the woman who is CEO of a banking firm(z). Reid successfully shows that transitivity allows the little girl who played in the sand and the woman who is CEO of a banking firm to have the same personal identity condescension the fact that the woman who is CEO of a banking firm may not remember ever being the little girl who played in the sand. collectible to the fact that Reids ch allenge is successful in showing that the CEO and the little girl who played in the sand can be the same person and share the same personal identity, it shows that Lockes theory denies the fact that the CEO and the little girl who played in the sand are the same person which ignores the logic of transitivity and is therefore false. Lockes criterion does not take into consideration the transitivity property and Reids challenge points out this clear and big flaw.Reids challenge explains that Lockes criterion of personal identity completely ignores the logic of transitivity. His challenge proves that Lockes criterion, without any changes applied, fails because it cannot just ignore the transivity property. However, Derek Parfit, a British philosopher who also explored the topic of personal identity, suggested a possible resolving power to slightly change Lockes criterion to make it so that it meets this challenge. Parfits suggested resolving power is to make the criterion of personal identity overlapping chains of memory. Going back to the modern example of the little girl who played in the sand and the CEO, Parfits suggested solution would state that if the student at the University of Toronto could remember being the little girl who played in the sand, and the CEO remembered being the student at the University of Toronto, then this overlapping chain of memories would allow the CEO to be the same person as the little girl who played in the sand.This solution helps Lockes theory overcome Reids challenge while still defending the core parts of Lockes theory. Parfits overlapping memory theory allows for the CEO and the little girl to be the same person, which covers the transitivity property. It allows x to be the same person as z. It also still allows for sameness of consciousness or memory theory to be the necessary criterion of personal identity. It fulfills the sufficient condition of the criterion if I remember eating a triple chocolate fudge bar, then I mus t have been the one that really ate the triple chocolate fudge bar, and fulfills the necessary condition of the criterion If I dont remember eating a triple chocolate fudge bar, as long as I remember buying the chocolate fudge bar to eat than I am the same person who later ate the triple fudge chocolate bar because I have overlapping chains of memory that allow me to be the same person. The necessary condition is fulfilled because it shows that through the overlapping chains of memory I may not remember everything but as long as I remember enough to continue the chain of memories, I will be the same person.Although this solution is a sound response to Reids challenge, it does not give a specific conclusion for what the criterion of identity truly is. It states that instead of the criterion being one specific definition, it is more like a group of experience, memories and thoughts that make us the same person at time one and time two. However, Parfits argument is a sound response to Reids challenge and therefore does successfully transform Lockes view so that it will meet the transitivity property as well as the necessary condition of consciousness. Overall, Lockes view on personal identity is just one of many and there will be many more to come on this complicated and deep topic.